South Africa has overcome adverse initial conditions to achieve a remarkable fiscal transformation since the 1994 democratic elections, held amid uncertainty about its ability to maintain the rule of law and resist populist spending pressures. Constitutionally-based, durable and credible fiscal reforms have contained spending and rendered policy at all levels of government more transparent and accountable, and more predictable through multi-year budgeting. Extensive tax reform and more efficient tax collection has expanded revenue, permitting lower tax rates for both individuals and companies, and personal tax relief. Fiscal consolidation almost eliminated the budget deficit by 2005, and with improved debt management, has created a lower and more sustainable debt burden. While highly centralised revenue raising powers and greater decentralisation of expenditure to sub-national governments created a vertical fiscal imbalance, a strict no-bail out approach helped control provincial spending. The fiscal-monetary policy mix has stabilised the macro-economy and reduced uncertainty, reflected internationally in narrowed sovereign risk spreads and improved debt ratings. However, micro-service delivery in social expenditure has been disappointing (in some cases due to capacity constraints rather than inadequate fiscal allocations), and a long-term decline in infrastructure investment and capital stock is only belatedly receiving attention. The challenge is to increase social and infrastructure expenditure at a sustainable rate and to improve the quality of service delivery, to avoid undermining the gains in macroeconomic stability.
Introduction
The democratically-elected African National Congress government assumed office in April, 1994 amid great uncertainty about its ability to maintain the rule of law and resist unsustainable policies in the face of populist pressures. While dealing with the aftermath of the Apartheid era, it embarked simultaneously on a socio-economic transformation project in the spirit of the new Constitution. Inherited fiscal conditions presented a rather bleak picture.
There had been some moves towards broadening the tax base, but nevertheless, aggregate fiscal discipline was weak. Escalating government expenditure coupled with weak revenue collection had created burgeoning deficits, raising concerns about sustainability and the spectre of a debt trap. Allocative efficiency at a macro level had begun to improve even in the apartheid era, with shifts towards increased social spending (Van der Berg, 2001 ). However, allocation in sectors such as health and education left much to be desired. Operational efficiency was particularly weak in the homelands and under-serviced Black areas. On the whole, fiscal governance was bedevilled by a lack of transparency and accountability.
South African -as a small, open economy -has also had to respond to the uncertainty and volatility of globalisation, and this has curtailed fiscal policy discretion (Abedian, 1998; Calitz, 2000) . Globalisation has created pressures to reform fiscal policy institutions and budgetary systems, and also for policy convergence, including deficit reduction, tax reform to broaden the tax base (while lowering marginal rates), and the restructuring of public sector enterprises. Deviant fiscal behaviour, seen as a signal of unsound economic fundamentals, could be penalised by adverse foreign capital flows. Yet the greater integration of capital markets and increased international tax competition has constrained sovereign governments' ability to tax capital flows. It has even been suggested that competitive tax reductions could prevent the financing of significant social welfare spending, though Hines (2006) maintains there is still leverage for increased social expenditures despite greater economic openness.
This paper reviews the policies and outcomes of South Africa's fiscal reform since 1994, and explores the main challenges it has raised. Despite the initial conditions, the South African government has achieved a remarkable turnaround in the fiscal position over the decade (see also Horton, 2005) . A large and sustained fiscal adjustment has been supported by the creation of a transparent, constitutionally-compliant intergovernmental fiscal relations system, increased quality of fiscal data, and improved budget planning and control at all levels of government. The reform of taxation policy, guided by an expert commission, and more efficient tax collection under a new revenue service, have produced impressive increases in revenues, permitting widespread tax relief to individuals. Expenditure constraint was exercised initially while the tax system was comprehensively overhauled, promoting a more durable adjustment (Mackenzie et al, 1997) . The composition of the fiscal adjustments, containing personnel related expenditures, subsidies and transfers while actually lowering both company and personal tax rates, have further enhanced the credibility and likely durability of the reform Alesina and Ardagna, 1998) . Aggregate budget constraints have been respected for both national and provincial spheres of government.
Medium-term expenditure frameworks have guided expectations, and feasible deficit targets (Aron and Muellbauer, 2007a,b) . Together the fiscalmonetary policy mix has enhanced macroeconomic stability, thereby reducing uncertainty and improving the investment climate. The fiscal adjustment has not been without its difficulties, however, particularly in micro-service delivery in social expenditure areas (such as education, health and housing), while infrastructure spending plans, for instance to ease congestion in South Africa's ports and railways, were instituted ambitiously but far too late.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2, the improved governance of fiscal policy with its base in constitutional provisions is discussed. The key fiscal reforms since 1994 are summarised in section 3. The performance of national fiscal policy is examined in section 4, by means of the trends of the main budget indicators, measures of the cyclically adjusted fiscal stance, a comparison of budget projections and actual outcomes, the management and 1 The initial debt to GDP ratio was in fact less than the Maastricht requirement for EU entry. The rapid increase in the debt ratio, the budget deficit and the primary deficit, however, gave cause for alarm.
sustainability of debt, and, finally, the contribution of fiscal policy to South Africa's improved macroeconomic stability. Section 5 explores the implications of the vertical fiscal imbalance created by a combination of highly centralised revenue raising powers and increased decentralisation of expenditure responsibility to sub-national governments. Section 6 details the trends in the consolidated government's expenditure priorities, focusing on two areas where service delivery has been poor, housing and education. Section 7 concludes.
Improved Governance of Fiscal Policy
In South Africa, unlike many other countries, the ideals of good fiscal governance are constitutionally entrenched. The adoption of South Africa's first Constitution in 1996 2 precipitated a paradigm shift in public policy and a restructuring of the public sector. The
Constitution required that budget processes of all three spheres of government promote transparency, accountability and effective financial management (sections 215-217).
Legislation was mandated to characterize the form of these budgets and when they were tabled. Parliament was granted powers to exercise more effective oversight over budget formulation and implementation (sections 55 and 77), and even to amend Money Bills.
During the Apartheid era, Parliament's role was merely to "rubber stamp" the budget.
Prior to the 1996 Constitution, the system of fiscal governance in South Africa was highly fragmented, and the wholly inadequate oversight mechanisms resulted in great inefficiencies.
There were several distinct budgets in the old dispensation, including those of four provincial administrations and ten homelands (comprising four notionally "independent states" and six notionally "self-governing" territories). Each homeland had, at least on paper, a legislative assembly, a political executive and an administration of public servants. These separate public services had thus to be merged, consolidated and rationalised, while avoiding breakdown in service delivery. The adoption of the Constitution precipitated a complete restructuring into a unitary state with three spheres of government: national, nine provincial governments and 283 local municipalities (down from 784 in the Apartheid era). The Constitution exerted three major influences on the nascent fiscal arrangements of the democratic South Africa: the impetus towards budget and financial management reform; the creation of a fiscally decentralised system of intergovernmental fiscal relations; and the provision of justiciable socio-economic rights.
2 An Interim Constitution was adopted in 1994 and the Final Constitution in 1996.
The Constitution required the establishment of a National Treasury to apply recognised accounting practices, classifications and norms to ensure transparency and expenditure control in each sphere of government, and when financing the deficit through increased public debt (section 216). Procurement at each level was expected to be "fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective" -though preferential allocation in some cases was allowed for. 3 The National Assembly of the Parliament was charged with providing mechanisms to enforce oversight for greater accountability (chapter 4) and oversight over budget formulation and implementation. For greater provincial expenditure control, provision was made for halting for up to four months the transfer of national funds to provinces in breach of legislation, pending Parliamentary approval and a report from the Auditor General.
The emerging intergovernmental fiscal system was influenced by the constitutional requirements for expenditure assignment, revenue raising powers and intergovernmental grants, and borrowing powers. 
Fiscal Reforms since 1994
Fiscal reform initiatives were first articulated through government macroeconomic programmes, the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), launched in January, 1994, and the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy of June, 1996. Fiscal prudence, tax reform and increased transparency of administration, a reorientation of spending to social sector spending and longer term expenditure planning, were hallmarks of both the RDP and the GEAR plans. The fiscal reform strategy has been remarkably consistent over time, and can be roughly broken down into three broad areas: budget and financial management reform; the creation of the intergovernmental fiscal system; and tax policy and administration reforms.
The budget and financial management reform imperatives of the 1996 constitution were given substance by the Public Finance Management Act of 1999, initiating the move from an inputoriented expenditure control system towards a more performance oriented system. The Act formally established the National Treasury, amalgamating the former departments of Finance and State Expenditure. As pointed out by Siebrits and Calitz (2004) , the 1999 Act does not prescribe numerical fiscal rules, but emphasises "regular financial reporting, sound internal expenditure controls, independent audit and supervision of control systems, improved accounting standards and training of financial managers, and greater emphasis on outputs and Holiday Scheme and accelerated depreciation allowances. In due course transfer pricing and thin capitalisation provisions were incorporated in the Income Tax Act. Several double tax treaties with foreign jurisdictions were concluded, and there was also a move from source to residence based taxation.
Performance of National Fiscal Policy
South Africa since 1994 has not adopted legislated constraints on fiscal variables for the national government (i.e. fixed fiscal targets), or numerical rules in the manner of monetary policy (Aron and Muellbauer, 2007b) . The rationale behind fiscal rules which pre-commit to 6 The Budget Council, formalised in the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act of 1997, consists of the National Minister of Finance and his nine provincial counterparts. The Financial and Fiscal Commission attends Budget Council meetings as an observer. 7 The formula based revenue sharing mechanism initially applied only to provincial governments, but was extended to local governments in 1998/99.
certain policies is that they, in principle, trade-off reduced policy-setting freedom and flexibility for greater self-discipline and fiscal credibility. Fiscal rules cannot substitute for authentic government commitment to fiscal discipline, since they can relatively easily be circumvented, ignored or abandoned (Kopits and Symansky, 1998) . Siebrits and Calitz (2004) characterize the fiscal regimes used in South Africa as "target-guided discretion" during 1994-98, and "transparency-based discretion" thereafter, with an underlying strong commitment to fiscal prudence. They argue that the flexible nature of these regimes has proved beneficial in a volatile external environment of currency crises, political democratization and strong popular pressure for more expansionary policies. Moreover, the limited discretion of fiscal policy has not lost credibility to the Treasury, given its consistent fiscal discipline in practice.
Trends of the main budget indicators
A feature of the first decade from 1994 is that the authorities maintained a fairly tight overall fiscal position, despite political pressures or constitutional commitments for some degree of expansion, and while operating in a not always favourable external environment. At a national level, the considerable fiscal consolidation has been sustained through a mix of expenditure cuts, revenue gains -especially from income taxes, and improved administration. Given that provincial governments have negligible own revenue sources, the emphasis there was more on expenditure control, especially in the wake of provincial overspending in 1997/98, discussed in section 5. Consolidation has been supported by the reforms outlined in section 3.
In consequence, there has been a significant reduction in the budget deficit, and an improved primary balance, reflecting more sustainable debt management (Figure 1 ).
Early in 1994, the future government had launched the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which emphasised fiscal adjustment. Shortly after the election success of 1994, the government announced a targeted reduction in the budget deficit of 2.5 percent of GDP over five years, constant revenues as a share of GDP and cuts in non-interest expenditure. During the early phase of adjustment under the RDP, the fiscal authorities established credibility by meeting deficit targets ( budget and the following two budgets, a larger deficit of 3.1 percent was projected, with plans for increased social sector spending (including the provision of HIV/AIDS drugs) and capital spending. In the event, the actual deficits were far lower, at 2.3 percent, 1.5 percent and only 0.4 percent of GDP, respectively, partly due to poor capacity in provincial administrations resulting in unspent funds. The MTEF projections to 2008/09 continue to signal the government's intention to maintain a more expansionary stance.
The tax reforms over the last decade have markedly improved the effectiveness of tax collection and revenue sources have diversified ( was also characterised by increases in the number of user charges (e.g. toll road fees, hospital fees and other direct payments for benefits received). Calitz and Siebrits (2003) have noted the redistributive thrust of these charges.
Cyclically adjusted fiscal measures
To estimate the fiscal stance purely as a result of discretionary fiscal policy, a correction can be made for cyclical economic factors that may have affected revenue and expenditure. For instance, in periods where output exceeds potential or trend output (that is, where the output gap is positive), there will be an enhanced tax take from the increased output and possibly reduced expenditures on social benefits due to greater demand in the economy, resulting in an overall contraction of the budget deficit. A simple way to adjust fiscal estimates cyclically is to employ a measure of the output gap to adjust revenue and expenditure values relative to GDP to the amounts needed to maintain revenue and expenditure at the level of a neutral or base year, that is, a year when potential and actual output approximately coincided.
Subtracting these neutral levels of revenue and expenditure from actual levels of revenue and expenditure, gives the revenue stance and expenditure stance, from which the fiscal stance can be calculated.
We update the exercise of Horton (2005) , estimating potential output for South Africa using a Hodrick Prescott filter, but choosing the fiscal year 2000/01 as the reference year when the output gap was close to zero. 8 The fiscal stance, shown in Table 1 , is calculated as the difference between the revenue stance and the (non-interest) expenditure stance, or the primary balance relative to its neutral value 9 . The annual change in the fiscal stance is termed the fiscal impulse, and it reveals whether policy tightened (negative impulse) or loosened (positive impulse). The revenue or expenditure impulses can reveal the sources of the policy change. Table 1 The degree of fiscal discipline is remarkable in the light of theories of public expenditure, such as the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis which posits that, in countries with highly unequal income distribution, the extension of voting rights to lower-income groups is likely to increase the growth of redistributive public expenditure (Meltzer and Richard, 1981) . Black et al (2005, p.97-98) point to two factors that help explain the restraint: some redistribution had already occurred prior to 1994; and post-1994 reforms achieved a reallocation of spending without significant increases in government's overall expenditure share. The signalling effect for global capital flows alluded to earlier may also have contributed to the fiscal restraint.
Budget projections and actual outcomes
The deviations of actual revenue, non-interest expenditure and balance measures from budget targets, as a percentage of GDP, are also shown in Table 1 
Debt management and sustainability
The net borrowing requirement of the main budget is obtained by subtracting extraordinary transfers from the deficit on the main budget and adding extraordinary receipts and debt service has correspondingly fallen from 6 to just above 3 percent of GDP. Foreign debt remains a small proportion of overall debt, at just above 4 percent of GDP in 2005/06, up more smoothly, since a social benefits system is not developed in South Africa (social expenditures are planned in advance for means-tested or age-threshold groups). 10 Extraordinary transfers include premiums received on destination bonds in switch auctions. Extraordinary receipts include proceeds of sale of state assets and strategic supplies, as well as "book profit" on domestic government bond buy-backs and source bonds issued in source auctions.
from about 1 percent of GDP in 1993/94. Foreign debt rose to nearly 8 percent of GDP in 2001/02, reflecting increased borrowing (at longer maturities) and the effects of the rand depreciation. Debt management has focused on extending the maturities of foreign debt and domestic debt, consolidating debt instruments and introducing inflation-indexed bonds.
Increased diversification and an improved term structure of debt have contributed to reduced fiscal risk.
Horton (2005) The fiscal-monetary policy mix has created an environment of macroeconomic stability conducive to future growth (Aron and Muellbauer, 2005) . Empirical evidence suggests that investment in South Africa is substantially driven by uncertainty. This is true for private sector physical capital augmentation, for portfolio capital flows and for foreign direct investment (Fielding 2000; Fedderke and Liu, 2002; Fedderke, 2004; Fedderke and Romm, 2005 and Fedderke, 2006) , that should have been addressed earlier. In the case of low quality education and training, another important long-term constraint on growth, the discussion in section 6 suggests that fiscal allocation is only part of the solution to these ills. The issue is not the quantum of education expenditure (this is South Africa's single largest non-interest government expenditure item and it spends much more than its developing country counterparts), but effectiveness and efficiency.
Fiscal decentralisation
The highly centralised nature of revenue raising powers in South Africa, with increased decentralisation of expenditure responsibility, has created a vertical fiscal imbalance. The provincial governments face significant expenditure mandates, but have restricted own financial resources. Provincial governments are highly dependent on the "equitable share" grant, regulated by section 214 of the Constitution, to finance the implementation of their constitutionally assigned functions. After deducting interest obligations and other statutory payments from total tax collected by SARS and other revenues, the balance is "equitably" split up among the three spheres of government. The provinces also receive conditional grants which they have to earmark for pre-specified purposes, such as health, infrastructure, housing and social development. This increase in revenue for sub-national governments helped to finance their increased expenditure responsibilities.
The fiscal federalism literature suggests that such a mismatch between revenue and expenditure powers could potentially weaken accountability at the margin and lead to soft budget constraints at sub-national levels, possibly even creating disincentives for raising resources at the national level (Shah, 1994) . Conventionally, it is suggested that the assignment of spending responsibility should precede the division of tax powers. However, Rao and Singh (1999) suggest the choice between assigning tax powers and providing transfers to sub-national governments to finance their services, depends upon the trade-off between the additional efficiency loss due to sub-national taxation and efficiency gains from cost-efficient spending by them (plus considerations of regional equity). In Australia, Breton (1996) and Groenewegen (1979) argue that vertical fiscal imbalances in fiscal federal arrangements reflect rational economic motives, as the "high coordination costs" of administering income tax and some other taxation have required "high concentration" of powers. Similarly, Momoniat (2002), one of the architects of the South African fiscal system, suggests that the design, though departing from the conventional prescripts of fiscal federalism theory, has been advantageous. He argues for the maximisation of the revenue potential of existing revenue sources, and phasing in devolved additional taxation powers only after effective expenditure controls and efficient revenue collection procedures are firmly in place. The risk of moral hazard could then be contained with a strict no-bail out approach by the government, backed by a policy of not guaranteeing sub-national loans or deficits.
12 Corporations can deduct interest on debt from taxable profits, while households cannot deduct such interest from taxable income, and interest rates have fallen with lower inflation. National government eventually did intervene in terms of section 100 14 of the Constitution, in response to this overspending episode. The two most affected provinces (the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal) were bailed out and further funds were distributed to all the provincial governments. There were fears that this would lead to a softening of the provincial governments' budget constraints; however, the bail outs were conditional on improvements in financial management and an undertaking by the affected provinces to run budget surpluses in 1998/99 to repay their debt. This took considerable political will, given the fact that KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape are two of the poorest provinces in South Africa with a significant social backlog. A further payment was allocated to provincial governments in the 1998/99 adjustments budget, conditional on their agreement to implement debt repayment schedules.
The surpluses in 1999/00 and in 2000/01 were not solely a response to debt repayment obligations. They also reflected an inability to spend budget allocations, with the binding constraint not being purely financial, but rather one of management capacity, especially in 13 Not all civil servants from the ex-homelands had unique identity numbers or were on the government payroll system. In addition, "ghost" workers were rife. It is interesting to reflect on how the costs and benefits of consolidation were apportioned between national and provincial levels of government. The benefits would appear to have accrued mainly at national level (i.e. greater aggregate fiscal discipline leading to lower deficits and hence better country risk ratings and lower costs of borrowing). The provincial governments also gained from fiscal consolidation to the extent that decreasing interest payments freed up more discretionary resources that could be diverted to the social spending that comprises most of provincial expenditure. In terms of expenditure control and service delivery forgone, the bulk of the costs would probably have accrued to the provinces.
Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that provincial governments probably did not, and indeed still do not, have the capacity to spend intergovernmental grants effectively. So even if 14 This allows national government to intervene when a provincial government fails to meet an executive obligation. The Eastern Cape government had failed to make welfare payments, triggering constitutional court challenges, and had failed to pay creditors. 15 The horizontal division of the total provincial share to the individual provinces (and of the total local government share to individual municipalities) is effected by means of a formula. The formula is updated to reflect new census data, typically phased in over time in order to avoid undermining the predictability of provincial budgets. This primarily demographically driven formula is highly redistributive. Between 1998/99 and 2003/4, of the nine new provinces, the Northern Cape's share has remained fairly constant, the Western Cape and Eastern Cape shares have declined, and the shares of the more populous Gauteng, KwaZuluNatal and Limpopo have increased.
more funds were available, this may not have resulted in better quality infrastructure in previously disadvantaged areas or the recruitment of more skilled personnel to those areas.
What implications do these outcomes hold for the political economy of South Africa and the balance of power between the provincial and federal levels of government? The bottom line is that while South Africa has done exceptionally well in stabilising the macro-economy, the microeconomic objectives still require concerted focus. The creation of the provincial governments was not driven by economic motives, but primarily political motives. There is now concern about the future of provincial governments, especially those that are not delivering. One proposal has been to amalgamate provincial governments (e.g. Northern Cape and Western Cape; or Mpumalanga, Gauteng and Limpopo back into the old "Transvaal").
An alternative suggestion is to disestablish provincial legislatures, turning provincial governments back into administrative arms only. Unfortunately, the creation of the nine provincial legislatures created political rents for governing party elected members who could not get onto the national party list, and resistance could be expected from this vested interest group. On the other hand, political pressure in response to poor service delivery is mounting.
This may encourage the national government to "re-centralise" policy influence over provincial functions by reducing the fiscal autonomy to provincial governments in the grant system. This could be done by making large unconditional grants (like the equitable share grants) conditional.
Consolidated government's expenditure priorities
South Africa inherited a highly unequal wealth and income distribution and a legacy of decades-long discriminatory provision in health, education and infrastructure across population groups. The reorientation of spending away from defense and subsidies, and a reduced debt burden through improved debt management, has freed spending for social purposes, under the constraint of the overall fiscal targets. Consolidated national and provincial figures give an indication of the changing priorities accorded to expenditure categories. "Social services" jointly consume the bulk of non-interest consolidated national and provincial expenditure, averaging just below 60 percent of total expenditure (Table 3) .
Education expenditure at 22 percent is the single largest expenditure item of this category, followed by social development and health. Social welfare expenditure, which includes means-tested child support grants, disability grants and universal old age grants, is expected to increase to 18.5 percent of non-interest expenditure over the MTEF period, with health and education falling in importance to 11.8 and 20.7 percent, respectively (Table 3) .
We focus in detail on two categories, education and housing, to illustrate some of the achievements and constraints in social spending. Table 3 The divergence of private and social benefits is largest in basic education. The social rate of return to primary education is generally far higher than that of post-primary education in many developing countries. South Africa is one of the highest spenders on education among middle income countries in terms of GDP per capita and as a percentage of total expenditure.
Nevertheless, the quality of the educational outcomes is significantly inferior to comparable developing countries. This is partly explained by substantial infrastructure backlogs, inadequate access to learner support materials, unqualified teachers (especially in the crucial areas of mathematics and science) and low funding of adult basic education and early childhood development. Reduced disparities in funding allocation appear not to have reduced the variability of educational outcomes across provinces. Van der Berg (2007) finds that large differentials in performance among black schools cannot be attributed to socio-economic background or teaching resources, but rather to school management and the functioning of the schooling system. He concludes that additional fiscal resources on their own can only make a limited contribution to enhancing educational outcomes. Ensuring that poor schools have access to qualified teachers and better school management is not merely a fiscal problem, but a social problem with complex dimensions of location (rural/urban, city/township), language, race and union opposition to salary differentiation (Van der Berg, 2007).
Conclusion
South Africa has overcome adverse initial conditions and achieved a remarkable fiscal transformation over the last decade through adopting durable, credible and well-coordinated reforms, outlined in earlier sections of this paper. Allsopp and Vines (2005) in the economy. South Africa's international economic standing has been enhanced, evidenced by reduced sovereign risk spreads and improved debt ratings.
There are other complementary fiscal measures on households that could facilitate the work of the central bank. An example is well-designed property and land taxes. These could help contain the sharply rising debt-to-income ratios under liberalised credit markets in South Africa, partly driven by rising house and land prices, and which fuel consumption (Aron and Muellbauer, 2005) . Another instance is redressing the recent under-funding of Statistics South
Africa by the Treasury due to cost-cutting. This has proved misguided and costly in terms of reliable historical data on which to base monetary policy formulation (though this issue is belatedly receiving attention).
The undoubted macro-stability gains contrast sharply with poor delivery at the microeconomic level. The fiscal strategy underpinning the GEAR macro-programme was based on two major objectives. The first was a deficit reduction strategy, aimed at curtailing the growth of interest obligations, combating inflation and freeing up resources for investment in infrastructure and human capital. The second pillar was the budget reform programme to strengthen redistribution. The underlying rationale seems to have been that even though the quantum of expenditure would decline, this would be offset by the enhanced equity, efficiency and effectiveness in the way these resources were used. While the former objective has been attained, the latter has, at best, only been partially achieved. International reform experience cautions that the benefits of budget reforms such as the medium term expenditure framework, performance based budgeting and accruals only manifest themselves over an eight to ten year horizon. The sheer magnitude of the budget reform project was probably underestimated by the incoming government, both because the degree and scope of dysfunction in the inherited apartheid fiscal machinery could not have been fully ascertained then, and given the magnitude of the economic development problems facing South Africa.
The timing and synchronization of the costs and benefits of these two strategies has also proved problematic. Deficit reduction created immediate, concentrated costs to society, with its (uncertain) benefits only to be realised in the future. There were also substantial set-up costs associated with the budget reform 19 , and thereafter, incremental maintenance costs. The near term adjustment has therefore been painful: the full costs of deficit reduction but few of its benefits; some of the costs of budget reform, with diffused benefits expected mainly towards the end of its implementation.
The hard-won sustainability of fiscal policy might be threatened in the future. Reduced revenue collection windfalls coupled with fiscal risk from the existing social security entitlements will have to be carefully managed. In addition, mediocre improvements in the quality and scope of actual service delivery and the continuing dearth of management capacity for delivery, in a context of an increasing number of households, the ravages of HIV/AIDS, improvements in economic growth insufficient to substantially lower unemployment and persisting poverty, inequality and deprivation, could mean the government will face increasing pressure to extend existing cash-based entitlements. Lobbying in recent years for the proposed introduction of a universal Basic Income Grant is a case in point.
Political sustainability of policies is at least as important as fiscal sustainability. Further, a long-term decline in infrastructure investment and capital stock is only belatedly receiving attention. The challenge for South Africa is to increase social and infrastructure expenditure at a sustainable rate and to enhance the quality of service delivery, to avoid undermining the impressive fiscal stability gains at the macroeconomic level. b. Average annual growth rates for retirement funds tax introduced in 1996/97, is from 1996/7-1990/00. c Taxes on property includes donations tax, estate duty, marketable securities tax and transfer duties. d Including sales duty, replaced by general sales tax in July, 1978, and value added tax in Sept.,1991 e Includes customs duties, import surcharges, diamond export duties, miscellaneous customs and excise income, as well as ordinary levy collections. f Including the former fuel levy directed to Regional Services Councils and the levy allocated to the National Road Fund for the period 1983/84 to 1986/87. g Including various levies, mining leases and ownership, cinematographic tax and other special levies, the skills development levy, specific and ad valorem taxes, and stamp duties and fees. h. MTEF period.
